Production checklist
-
Z4J_SECRETandZ4J_SESSION_SECRETeach independently set to 64 hex chars of entropy. -
Z4J_AUDIT_CHAIN_SECRETset to a further independent key of at least 32 bytes. Outside development this is required and has no fallback, so the brain will refuse to start without it. Store it where whoever administers the database cannot read it, otherwise the audit chain proves less than it appears to. -
Z4J_PUBLIC_URLset to the public HTTPS URL (used in emails, cookies, cors). - TLS terminated in front of the brain;
X-Forwarded-Protohonored. - Postgres 17+ with backups (
pg_dumpschedule or managed service snapshots). - At least two admin accounts (avoids lockout if one is lost).
- Email notification channel configured per project if you use invitations / password reset.
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Z4J_METRICS_AUTH_TOKENset (or auto-minted) and/metricsscraped by Prometheus. - Container resource limits set (not unlimited).
- Container healthcheck configured.
- Log aggregation sinks z4j's JSON stdout.
- Audit-chain verification runs on a schedule, one of two ways:
z4j audit verifyin cron / a Kubernetes CronJob, or the built-in worker viaZ4J_AUDIT_CHAIN_VERIFY_ENABLED=true(off by default, daily, leader-gated). -
Z4J_AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYSset to your actual retention obligation. The default is 90 days and rows past the window are deleted, not archived. - If you need audit evidence that survives a compromised database role: chain head exported on a schedule to a sink that role cannot rewrite, and verification run against it with
z4j audit verify --known-head. Without this, a clean verification means "nothing outside z4j's own write path touched this log", not "nothing touched this log".
Agents
Section titled “Agents”- One agent token per agent, stored in the app's secret manager.
- Token rotation plan documented (mint new → deploy → revoke old).
-
Z4J_BRAIN_URLuses the publichttps://brain base URL in production. The agent derives thewss://WebSocket endpoint itself. -
agent_namedistinguishes web / worker / beat / cron processes. - Egress firewall allows WebSocket to brain.
Security posture
Section titled “Security posture”- MFA enrolled for every admin, and
Z4J_MFA_ENFORCE_FOR_ADMINS(orZ4J_MFA_ENFORCE_FOR_ALL) set. Enforcement is off by default and gates cookie sessions only, so also revoke personal API keys for anyone who misses the enrollment deadline. See MFA. - Recovery codes distributed and stored somewhere the user can reach without their phone, and the
z4j reset-mfaescape hatch written into your runbook. - Redaction rules reviewed for your domain-specific secrets (see redaction).
- Rate limits verified on
/auth/*,/setup,/invite/*. - No
Z4J_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_*left in env after first boot. - Password policy appropriate for your org (length, complexity, denylist - all enforced by default).
- Audit retention policy documented. The built-in worker deletes rows older than
Z4J_AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS(90 days by default); archive externally first if you must retain them longer.
Operations
Section titled “Operations”- Runbook for "brain down" (restart, check Postgres, check disk).
- Runbook for "agent offline" (check token, network, app logs).
- Runbook for "stuck tasks" (reconciliation worker status, manual retry).
- Disaster recovery tested - can you restore Postgres + re-mint agent tokens?
Compliance notes
Section titled “Compliance notes”z4j is not certified against SOC 2, HIPAA, or ISO 27001. If you need compliance, the audit log export + Postgres backups provide most of the raw evidence, but you own the policies, controls, and external audit.
Know the gaps in that evidence before you build a control on top of it:
- The HMAC chain is evidence against everything that writes through z4j. It is not evidence against a role that can write the audit tables directly, which can roll the log back to a shortened history that still verifies. Export the chain head off-box on a schedule if that matters (see HMAC audit chain).
- Denied requests are mostly not recorded. A rejection for insufficient role writes no audit row on most API families; only mutating schedule routes offer one, best-effort.
- There is no SSO, OIDC, SAML, or SCIM. Identity federation and user deprovisioning have to run in a reverse proxy in front of the brain.